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OCTOBER, 1955
RECENT DECISIONS
Tort Imnmunity of Charities
Plaintiff's intestate brought this personal
injury action for injuries sustained in a fall
on the icy steps of the entrance to the de-
fendant church. The intestate was planning
to attend the evening service at the time of
the accident. Wisconsin had a safe-place
statute prescribing a certain standard of care
for public buildings and their structures. In
affirming the dismissal of the complaint, the
court held that the plaintiffs failed to show
the applicability of the statute in that the
step construction is neither integral to a pub-
lic building or a separate structure within
the meaning of the statute. The evidence also
was insufficient to constitute a cause of ac-
tion for nuisance. Meyers v. St. Bernard's
Congregation, 69 N.W.2d 302 (Wis.1954).
The case is significant in that the action
had to be founded on a statutory violation
or on a nuisance for the plaintiff to recover
because of the qualified espousal of Wiscon-
sin to the doctrine of an immunity to a char-
ity from liability in tort.' This immunity may
be absolute or subject to certain qualifica-
tions. The grant of non-liability may be
based on one or more of five theories,2 or it
'See Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Society
of Wisconsin, 218 Wis. 169, 260 N.W. 476 (1935);
Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160 N.W.
173 (1916).
'a. Trust Fund doctrine "[i]s based upon the rea-
soning that the assets of the institution created by
the founders thereof constitute a trust for particu-
lar charitable purposes and if it should be diverted
to the payment of judgments that might be ob-
tained in suits against the institution, the purpose
of the charity as well as that of its donors would
be frustrated and the charity perhaps destroyed."
Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124,
may be withheld on the fact of the status of
the wronged party," or the result may be de-
pendent on whether there is a finding of neg-
ligence in the selection or retention of the
tortfeasor employee or servant.4 Irrespective
of the legal soundness and desirability of
70 A.2d 230 (1950). This doctrine was followed
in Loeffler v. Trustees of Sheppard & Enoch Pratt
Hospital, 130 Md. 265, 100 AtI. 301 (1917).
But see Moore v. Moyle, 405 III. 555, 92 N.E.
2d 81 (1950) (trust fund immunity rule falls
where liability insurance carried); Nicholson v.
Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So.
344 (1940).
b. Respondeat superior doctrine provides the im-
munity on the basis that service by the servant
is not rendered for the financial benefit of the
master. Bachman v. Young Women's Christian
Ass'n, 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 751 (1922). Con-
tra: Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, 128
App. Div. 214, 112 N.Y.S. 566 (2d Dep't 1908).
c. Governmental Imnunity doctrine relies on the
fact that its close connection with the state in its
purposes entitles it to the immunity of the state
from suit, Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess
Society of Wisconsin 218 Wis. 169, 260 N.W.
476 (1935). But see Old Folks' and Orphan
Children's Home v. Roberts, 91 Ind. 533, 171 N.E.
10 (1930).
d. Implied Waiver doctrine extends to beneficiar-
ies where by reason of accepting benefits they
waive or assume the risk of negligence. Downs v.
Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60 N.W. 42
(1894). But see Sheehan v. North Country Com-
munity Hospital, 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E. 2d 28, 29
(1937).
e. Public Policy Theory supports the immunity by
declaring that the public interest of the charity is
of paramount interest to the state, even to the
extent of denying individuals recovery for its torts.
Southern Methodist University v. Clayton, 142
Tex. 179, 176 S.W. 2d 749 (1943). But see Ray v.
Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220
(1951).
"See note 6 infra.
'See note II infra.
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this immunity, 5 the fact remains that the
immunity of charitable organizations exists
in some form in over half of the states and
has existed in many others.
The treatment herein is limited to the im-
munity as it extends to the beneficiary of a
charity. The success of a claimant against
the charity may depend upon his status as a
gratuitous or paying beneficiary.6 It appears
as a general rule that a charity enjoys a com-
plete immunity as to its non-paying recipi-
ents in fifteen states; 7 twelve others confer
5See Andrews v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 226
Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186, 205 (1939). Bogert,
Trusts and Trustees § 401 (1935); Elkins, Tort
Liability of Charitable Institutions, 3 Hudson Co.
Bar Bull. 3 (Oct. 1954); Comment, Charitable
Institutions-Immunity from Tort Liability, 4 De
Paul L. Rev. 56 (1954).
'Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home and Hospital,
104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E. 287 (1922).
'Nev. Bruce v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 51
Nev. 372, 277 P. 798 (1929); see Md. Howard v.
South Baltimore General Hospital, 191 Md. 617,
62 A.2d 574, 575-576 (1948); Mass. Roosen v.
Peter Bent Bringham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126
N.E. 392, 393 (1920); Mo. Nicholas v. Evangeli-
cal Deaconess Home and Hospital, 281 Mo. 182,
219 S.W. i643 (1920); Ohio- Taylor v. Flower
Deaconess Home and Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61,
135 N.E. 287, 291 (1922); Ore.- Gregory v. Salem
General Hospital, 175 Ore. 464, 153 P.2d 837,
844-845 (1944); S.C.- Vermillion v. Woman's Col-
lege of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649, 650
(1916); Tenn.- Anderson v. Armstrong, 180 Tenn.
56, 171 S.W. 2d 401, 402 (1943); see Ky. Uni-
versity of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564,
106 S.W. 219 (1907); Idaho- Wilcox v. Idaho Falls
Latter Day Saints Hospital, 59 Idaho 350, 82
P.2d 849 (1938); Il1. Moore v. Moyle, 405 I11. 555,
92 N.E. 2d 81 (1950); Me. Jensen v. Maine Eye
and Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 Ati. 898
(1910); Mich. Downs v. Harper Hospital, 101
Mich. 555, 60 N.W. 42 (1894); N. J. Jones v. St.
Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 7 N. J. 533, 82
A.2d 187 (1951); Wis. - Schumacher v. Evangeli-
cal Deaconess Society of Wisconsin, 218 Wis. 169,
260 N.W. 476 (1935).
In Nevada, a charitable organization may volun-
tarily waive its exemption for the benefit of its
this exemption provided that there is no
showing of negligence in the selection or re-
tention of the injuring employee;8 and nine
adhere to the policy of liability.9 In cases
where paying beneficiaries seek redress
against the charity, twelve states grant an
members. Springer v. Federated Church of Reno,
Inc., 283 P.2d 1071 (1955).
'N. C. - Williams v. Union County Hospital Ass'n,
Inc., 234 N. C. 536, 67 S.E. 2d 662 (1951); see
Ga. -Burgess v. James, 73 Ga. 857, 38 S.E. 2d
637, 638 (1946); La. - Jurjevich v. Hotel Dieu, 11
So. 2d 632, 635 (La. 1943); Mont. - Borgeas v.
Oregon Short Line R. Co., 73 Mont. 407, 236 P.
1069, 1074 (1925); Neb. -Duncan v. Nebraska
Sanatarium Benevolent Ass'n, 92 Neb. 162, 137
N.W. 1120, 1121 (1912); Pa.-Gable v. Sisters
of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Atl. 1087, 1088-
1089 (1910); W. Va. - Fisher v. Ohio Valley Gen-
eral Hospital Ass'n, 73 S.E. 2d 667, 671 (W. Va.
1952); see Ark. - Crossett Health Center v. Cros-
well, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W. 2d 548 (1953);
Conn. - Evans v. Lawrence Memorial Associated
Hospitals, Inc., 133 Conn. 311, 50 A.2d 443
(1946); Tex. - Southern Methodist University v.
Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W. 2d 749 (1943);
Va. - Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent
de Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921); Wyo.
- Bishop Randall Hospital v. Hartley, 24 Wyo.
408, 160 Pac. 385 (1916). See also Restatement,
Trusts 402 (1935) (restricted to situations in
which title to trust property is in trustees per-
sonally rather than in the charitable corporation).
'See Kan. - Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175
Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934, 943 (1954); N. D. -
Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital, 74 N.D.
525, 23 N.W. 2d 247, 259-260 (1946); N. H.-
Welch v. Frisbe Memorial Hospital, 90 N.H. 337,
9 A.2d 761, 763-764 (1939); N. Y. - Sheehan v.
North Country Community House, 273 N.Y. 163,
166, 7 N.E. 2d 28, 29 (1937); Okla. -Gable v.
Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P.2d 244, 248
(1940); see Ariz. - Ray v. Tucson Medical Cen-
ter, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951); Colo. -
O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n,
105 Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d 835 (1939); Iowa-
Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa
1269, 45 N.W. 2d 151 (1950); Vt.-Foster v.
Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d
230 (1950).
However, New York grants immunity when a
professional act is involved.
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unqualified immunity to the charity, 10 at
least eleven make it dependent on an ab-
sence of corporate negligence in the selection
and retention of the wrongdoer," and seven-
"Idaho - Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints
Hospital, 59 Idaho 350, 82 P. 2d 849 (1938); Me.
-Jensen v. Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary, 107
Me. 408, 78 Atd. 898 (1910); Mass. - Roosen v.
Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126
N.E. 392 (1920); Mich.- Downs v. Harper Hos-
pital, 101 Mich. 555, 60 N.W. 42 (1894); Mo.-
Nicholas v. Evangelical Deaconess Home and Hos-
pital, 281 Mo. 182, 219 S.W. 643 (1920); N. J. -
Jones v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 7
N.J. 533, 82 A. 2d 187 (1951); Ore.- Gregory
v. Salem General Hospital, 175 Ore. 464, 153 P.
2d 837 (1944); see S. C. - Vermillion v. Woman's
College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649,
650 (1916); see Tenn. - Anderson v. Armstrong,
180 Tenn. 56, 171 S.W. 2d 401 (1943) (satisfac-
tion limited to non-Trust property); Ill. - Moore
v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E. 2d 81 (1950); Ky.
- Cook v. John N. Norton Memorial Infirmary,
180 Ky. 331, 202 S.W. 874 (1918); Wis.-Schu-
macher v. Evangelical Deaconess Society of Wis-
consin, 218 Wis. 169,260 N.W. 476 (1935). Rhode
Island has an immunity provided by statute for
the torts of officers and servants while acting in
the management of said hospital. 1938 Laws of
R. I., c. 116, §95.
"Conn. - Evans v. Lawrence Memorial Associated
Hospitals, Inc., 133 Conn. 311, 50 A. 2d 443
(1946); La. - Jurjevich v. Hotel Dieu, 11 So. 2d
632 (La. 1943); Mont. - Borgass v. Oregon Short
Line R. Co., 73 Mont. 407, 236 Pac. 1069 (1925);
Ohio - Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home and
Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E. 287 (1922);
Va. - Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent
de Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921); W.
Va.- Fisher v. Ohio Valley General Hospital
Ass'n, 73 S.E. 2d 667 (W. Va. 1952); Wyo. -
Bishop Randall Hospital v. Hartley, 24 Wyo. 408,
160 Pac. 385 (1916); see Ga.- Burgess v. James,
73 Ga. 857, 38 S.E. 2d 637, 638 (1946); see Ark.
- Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark.
874, 256 S.W. 2d 548 (1953); Ind.-Old Folks'
and Orphan Children's Home v. Roberts, 91 Ind.
App. 533, 171 N.E. 10 (1930); Tex.-Southern
Methodist University v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179,
176 N.W. 2d 749 (1943). See Restatement, Trusts
§402 (1935) (restricted to situations in which title
to trust property is in the trustees personally rather
than in the charitable corporation).
teen others make no distinction between the
torts of the charity's officer, employee, and
servant and the torts of others. 12 The law in
the other states is unsettled, with two states
having no reported cases.' 3 The weight of
authority appears only slightly in favor of
some type of immunity with the trend to-
wards liability.14 Thus, if the cause of action
is based on nuisance 15 or if the charity car-
"Ala. -Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191
Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Ariz. - Ray v. Tucson
Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951 );
Cal. - Silva v. Providence Hospital of Oakland,
14 Calif. 2d 762, 97 P. 2d 798 (1939); Del. -
Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 7 Ter. 392, 83 A.
2d 753 (1951); Fla. - Nicholson v. Good Samari-
tan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940);
Iowa - Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n 241
Iowa 1269, 45 N.W. 2d 151 (1950); Kan.- Noel
v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.
2d 934 (1954); Minn.- Borwege v. City of Owa-
tonna, 251 N.W. 915 (Minn. 1933); Miss. - Mis-
sissippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 156 Miss. 676,
55 So. 2d 142 (1951); N. H.-Welch v. Frisbe
Memorial Hospital, 90 N.H. 337, 9 A. 2d 761
(1939); N. Y. - Sheehan v. North Country Com-
munity House, 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E. 2d 28 (1937);
Okla. - Sisters of the Sorrowful Mother v. Zeidler,
183 Okla. 454, 82 P. 2d 996 (1938); Utah- Ses-
sions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Ass'n, 94 Utah
460, 78 P. 2d 645 (1938); Vt.- Foster v. Roman
Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d 230
(1950); Wash. - Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memo-
rial Hospital Ass'n, 43 W. 2d 162, 260 P. 2d 765
( 1953); See Colo.-O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado
Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d 835
(1939); N. D. - Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess
Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W. 2d 247 (1946).
'New Mexico and South Dakota.
"Six states since 1950 have laid down a liability
rule either rejecting precedent or resolving an open
question. Ariz., Del., Iowa, Kan., Miss., and Wash.
Six others, however, in this period have reaf-
firmed their immunity policy. Conn., Ill., Mo.,
N. J., N. C., and W. Va.
"See, e.g., Smith v. Congregation of St. Rose, 265
Wis. 393, 61 N.W. 2d 896 (1954).
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ries liability insurance, 16 the plaintiff may be
successful.
Some of the arguments advocating im-
munity are: (1) If the doctrine is overruled
in any particular fact pattern, it may have
unintended deleterious consequences else-
where; 7 (2) both the paying and non-pay-
ing recipients receive charity benefits and
therefore no distinction should be drawn in
their treatment;' 8 (3) the policy supporting
immunity is stronger than that upon which
the doctrine of respondeat superior is
based;' 9 (4) our society often makes a pri-
vate person sublimate himself for the com-
mon good; 20 and (5) the place of the private
charity is not to be displaced by a paternalis-
tic government and liability would necessi-
tate larger donations to meet added operating
expenses. 21
The proponents of liability urge the fol-
lowing reasons for their position: ( 1 ) chari-
ties are now operating in the area of big
business;22 (2) the confused state of the law-
demands that the legislature and not the
judiciary declare any policy exemption; 23
(3) federal and state welfare measures have
'See, e.g., Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 I11. App.
618, 76 N.E. 2d 342 (1947).
'See Weiss v. Swedish Hospital, 16 Wash. 446,
133 P. 2d 978,981 (1943).
" See Hospital of St. Vincent de Paul v. Thompson,
116 Va. 101, 81 S.E. 13, 15 (1914).
'"See Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess So-
ciety, 218 Wis. 169, 260 N.W. 476, 477 (1935).
"See Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West,
104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649, 650 (1916).
"'See Forrest v. Red Cross Hospital, Inc., 265 S.W.
2d 80, 82 (Ky. 1954).
'See Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214
Miss. 906, 55 S. 2d 142, 153 (1951).
2'See Welch v. Frisbe Memorial Hospital, 90 N.H.
337, 9 A. 2d 761, 764 (1939).
destroyed their public policy basis; 24 (4)
accumulations are so large as to permit an
absorption of liability;25 and (5) the chari-
ties can carry liability insurance.2 6
It is to be observed that the leading cases
in most jurisdictions have been concerned
with hospitals almost to an exclusion of the
other types of charitable endeavors. The
cases seem to bear out the thought that the
size and apparent financial soundness of
these institutions has been of no little mo-
ment in the formulation of a liability doc-
trine. However, it must be realized that the
rule of law so formulated from a hospital
fact pattern is probably binding down to the
least financially sound charity, such as spe-
cial schools, orphan homes, old-age homes,
religious activities, and the like. Insurance
costs of an expensive nature imposed by a
carrier over and above a reasonable standard
of care, might prove burdensome to a hospi-
tal, and yet these may be met and not sub-
stantially affect the achievement of its
humanitarian objective. It does not follow
that the other charities have as consistent an
income against which the reasonable insur-
ance protection required could be obtained
and that the end result will not be substan-
tially detrimental to its philanthropic pur-
pose. This nevertheless is the necessary
result under the probable universal rule of
law that follows from a hospital fact pattern.
It is probable that this adverse effect has
been considered by the courts. Indeed, had
the courts differentiated among charities on
"'See Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22,
230 P. 2d 220, 229 (1951).
2
1See Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan.
751, 267 P. 2d 934, 939 (1954).
"Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital
Ass'n, 43 W. 2d 162, 260 P. 2d 765, 771 (1953).
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the basis of size or type of activity, it appar-
ently could be challenged as discriminatory
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
thought that liability must be imposed on the
larger undertakings has necessarily carried
over to the smaller. The conclusion neverthe-
less remains that the compelling reasons for
any immunity still exist for many types of
activities and at least to preserve the smaller
capitalized ones for their societal value to
the state.
Legislation appears to be the only solution
and this would have to be relative to con-
ditions in each jurisdiction. In some, all
activities might find justification under an
immunity statute and in others, only a few
would deserve a non-liability status for their
negligent harms. Such precise law-making
would be equitable and beneficial to the in-
dividual, the charity, society and the state.
It is submitted that consideration be given
to the following suggestions to rectify by
legislation the unfortunate results that a de-
cisional law of liability in this field neces-
sarily must carry:
(1) Eliminate the cause of action in
those activities of a charitable insti-
tution where insurance costs would
substantially frustrate the purpose of
the charity;
(2) Limit the maximum recovery in
negligent harms in which certain
enumerated types of charities are
involved;
(3) Require more frequent and closer
scrutinization of rates to charities by
the State Superintendents of Insur-
ance that these may be as uniform
and as reasonable as conditions per-
mit;
(4) Consider the number of individuals
in the jurisdiction who carry liability
insurance, either in their own or
through their employers, and the
relevance of this to the average inci-
dence of negligent charitable wrongs
in the jurisdiction; and
(5) Evaluate the state-afforded facilities
in each type of charitable endeavor
as against the societal value of the
particular activity in that jurisdiction
by private operation.
Loans to Schools
Recently, a bill was introduced in the
New Hampshire Legislature creating an
Authority to act as an agency and subdivi-
sion of the state, for the purpose of making
construction loans at advantageous rates of
interest to any academy, seminary of learn-
ing, private school, junior college or col-
lege, incorporated and situated in New
Hampshire, provided such institution was
operated for charitable purposes and its
net income was devoted exclusively to such
purposes. If an educational institution met
these qualifications it would then have to
furnish security, contribute to a reserve
fund to be held as insurance against loss,
pay the costs of processing the loan and,
until repayment, hold and use the project
for which the loan is made, for educational
purposes.1
The funds to be loaned would not come
from the state treasury, but rather the Au-
thority would issue bonds which would be
payable solely out of the receipts from the
loans. Moreover, the bonds would not be a
debt of the state, except that their payment
'New Hampshire Senate Bill No. 41 (printed in
the appendix of the Senate Journal on Tuesday,
May 17, 1955 at pages 21 to 30 inclusive).
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would be guaranteed in the state's name.
The Senate referred the bill to the Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court who are author-
ized to render an advisory opinion as to
the constitutionality of pending legislation.
The Justices held the bill constitutional,
and, although the bill was ultimately de-
feated, the opinion is significant.
The Justices noted that the New Hamp-
shire Constitution imposes a duty upon
legislators to encourage private and public
educational institutions, 2 and that the pro-
gram did not involve any expenditure of
state money. The bonds would be self-
liquidating. Apparently the Court believed
its opinion should go further. Since the
bonds would be guaranteed by the state, it
is possible (despite all the safeguards in-
corporated in the bill) that the state might
some day be liable on its guaranty, if the
borrower defaulted. Therefore, the bill was
considered on an equal footing with any
bill that would be certain to require the ex-
penditure of state funds raised by taxation.
The Justices held it would be constitutional,
even when examined in this light.
The Court considered the bill with rela-
tion to the test of public or private benefit.
"The furtherance of education is univer-
sally regarded as a public purpose," said the
court in rejecting the argument that this bill
would involve diverting public funds to-
wards private enterprises. Citing the case of
Trustees of Phillps Exeter Academy v.
Exeter,' as authority for the proposition
that such an expenditure of public funds is
within the scope of the protective power of
the state, the court fortified its arguments
by referring to a later opinion in the same
case, wherein it was said, "[a]n educa-
N.H. Const. Pt 1I, art. 83.
'90 N.H. 472, 482-83, 27 A. 2d 569, 579 (1940).
tional institution established for no per-
sonal profit and serving only the public
benefit is a charity .... The charity being
solely a form of public service, a grant to
it is for public use and benefit. ",
4
Although not adverted to in the opinion,
it should be observed that the New Hamp-
shire Constitution does contain the follow-
ing statement, ". . . provided, neverthe-
less, that no money raised by taxation shall
ever be granted or applied for the use of
the schools or institutions of any religious
sect or denomination ..."
It does not appear whether the Court
attempted to reconcile this clause of the
New Hampshire Constitution with its state-
ment that, since the bill in question could
involve an expenditure of public funds it
"stands on equal footing" with any bill cer-
tain to require such an expenditure. Per-
haps the court considered the constitutional
prohibition as relating only to direct grants
by the state to schools or institutions of any
religious sect or denomination and as not
barring payments to bondholders who had
loaned money to such schools or institu-
tions through a state agency when those ob-
ligations were guaranteed by the state.
However, the solution to this apparent con-
flict lies elsewhere. The Supreme Court of
New Hampshire pointed to a long history,
dating from 1833, of legislative aid to pri-
vate educational institutions. The opinion
of the court that the bill under considera-
tion was not unconstitutional is consistent
with this firmly established tradition.
A contrary result would be reached in
the State of New York. "Neither the state
nor any subdivision thereof shall use its
property or credit ... or permit either to be
'Trustees of Phillips Exeter Academy v. Exeter,
92 N.H. 473, 479, 33 A. 2d 665, 670 (1943).
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used, directly or indirectly, in aid or main-
tenance ... of any school or institute of
learning wholly or in part under the control
or direction of any religious denomination,
or in which any denominational tenet or
doctrine is taught. . . ." [emphasis sup-
plied], This section, prohibiting the use of
the state's credit, would bar the device of
setting up an Authority to issue state guar-
anteed bonds. Incidentally, the constitution
would not allow aid to any incorporated
nondenominational institution.' ;
Unfortunately, these provisions of the
New York State Constitution are found in
some form or other in almost every state
Constitution. There are 26 state Constitu-
tions that forbid state aid to any sectarian
schools or institutions of learning.' Some
27 state Constitutions prohibit the lending
of the credit of the state to any individual,
association, or corporation.8 It should be
N.Y. Const. art. XI §4.
'Id. at art. VII §8.
'Ala. Const. art. 14 §263; Cal. Const. art. 9 §8
and art. 4 §30; Colo. Const. art. 5 §34 and art. 9
§7; Del. Const. art. 10 §§3-4; Fla. Const. art. 12
§13; Idaho Const. art. 9 §5; 111. Const. art. 8 §3;
La. Const. art. 4 §8 and art. 12 §13; Mass. Const.
art. 46 §148; Minn. Const. art. 8 §3; Miss. Const.
art. 8 §208; Mo. Const. art. 9 §8; Mont. Const.
art. 11 §8; Neb. Const. art. 7 §11; Nev. Const. art.
II § 155; N. M. Const. art. 12 §3; N. Y. Const.
art. II §4; Ohio Const. art. 6 §2; Okla. Const. art. 2
.5; Pa. Const. art. 3 §§17-18; S. C. Const. art. I1
§9; Tex. Const. art. 7 §5; Utah Const. art. 10 §13;
Va. Const. art. 9 §141; Wash. Const. art. 1 §11;
Wyo. Const. art. 3 §36.
Ariz. Const. art. 9 §7; Ark. Const. amend. no. 20
(majority of voters may suspend); Colo. Const.
art. II § I; Fla. Const. art. 9 § 10; Idaho Const. art.
8 §2; III. Const. art. 4 §20; Iowa Const. art. 7 §1;
Ky. Const. § 177; La. Const. art. 4 §8; Md. Const.
art. 3 §34; Mass. Const. art. 46 §148 and art. 62
observed that this section, although typical,
is not always literally construed. In Louisi-
ana, for example, a similar section has not
prevented the enactment of a statute giving
direct aid to sectarian schools."
Although 13 states have no constitu-
tional prohibition, 10 legislation similar to
that recently defeated in New Hampshire
might meet with the same unsurmountable
obstacles of an extra-legal nature. Such leg-
islation might have to contend with deep-
rooted ideas of a socio-political nature.
§192; Mich. Const. art. 10 §12; Minn. Const. art. 9
§10; Miss. Const. art. 14 §258; Mo. Const. art.
3 §39; Mont. Const. art. 13 §1; Neb. Const.
art. 13 §3; N. J. Const. art. 8 §2 1; N. M. Const.
art. 9 §14; Ohio Const. art. 8 §4; Pa. Const. art.
9 §6; S. C. Const. art. 10 §6; Tenn. Const. art. 2
§31; Wash. Const. art. 8 §5 and art. 12 §9; W. Va.
Const. art. 10 §6; Wis. Const. art. 8 §3; Wyo.
Const. art. 16 §6.
""The Louisiana State Board of Education shall
construct, repair, equip, and furnish necessary
buildings and improve the facilities at the educa-
tional and charitable institutions of the state,
whether such institutions are under its supervision
or not .. " La. Rev. Stat. tit. 17, §2151.
'aConn. Const. art. 8 §2; Del. Const. art. 8 §4
(such appropriation would require a 3/4 vote of
the members of both houses); Ga. Const. art. 7 §3
§2-5601 (State itself cannot incur the debt); Ind.
Const. art. 10 §5 (State itself cannot incur the
debt); Kan. Const. art. 11 §7 (State itself cannot
incur the debt); Me. Const. art. 8 and art. 9 §14;
Mass. Const. art. 46 § 148 (prohibition of state aid
does not apply to institutions of higher learning.
Opinion of the Justices, 214 Mass. 599, 102 N.E.
464 (1913) ); N.C. Const. art. 5 §4 (State's credit
may be loaned if a majority of the people so vote);
Ore. Const. art. 1 §5 (money for benefit of relig-
ious institutions may not be drawn from the treas-
ury); R. 1. Const. art. 4 §14 (such appropriation
would require a 2/3 vote of members elected to
each house of the general assembly); S. D. Const.
art. 10 §2; The Constitutions of N. D. and Vt.,
make no reference to the lending of state credit.
